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Abstract
In this paper I analyse a probabilistic voting model where political
candidates choose a direct taxation policy to maximise the probability
of winning elections. Society is divided into groups which have di¤erent
preferences for consumption of leisure or, in other words, are di¤erently
single-minded on the amount of leisure. The use of a probabilistic voting
model characterized by the presence of single-minded groups breaks down
the classic results obtained by using the median voter theorem, because it
is no longer only the level of income which drives the equilibrium policies
but also the ability of groups to focus on leisure. The robustness of these
results is also demonstrated in the presence of heterogeneity in the labour
income. Finally, using data from the Luxemburg Income Study, I demon-
strate that the cohort-specic inequality is signicantly a¤ected by the
structure of the taxation system and that policies chosen by politicians
do not seem to be originated by the goal of equality.
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1 Introduction
All modern democracies impose direct taxes on income in order to achieve re-
distribution goals. A common belief taken from the optimal theory of taxation
a¢ rms that a better income distribution may be achieved via a system where
income tax paid as a fraction of before-tax income increases somewhat with
income. Nevertheless, even though statutory schedules are revised from time to
time, the stylised facts show that in Britain and America "from the 1970s to
the 1990s inequality rose in both countries" and "redistribution toward the poor
tends to happen least in those times and polities where it would seem most justi-
ed by the usual goal of welfare policy" (Lindert (2000)). Other evidence which
shows an increasing level of inequality within industrialized countries was found
by Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000). Finally, a comprehensive study made by
the United Nations (WIDER 2000) demonstrated that a recent increase in in-
equality has taken place in several countries such as Australia, United Kingdom,
United States, Chile, Peru, Bangladesh, China, Philippines and Poland. As a
result, it seems that redistribution and equity goals are far from being reached
even in more industrialised countries.
It is interesting to investigate the possible causes of this failure and this paper
suggests that an explanation can be found in the analysis of the political process.
In particular, I suggest that the level of inequality in income distribution is due
to the existence of voter-seeking candidates who maximise the probability of
winning elections instead of the social welfare function as in the theory of opti-
mal taxation. This is of course not a completely new attempt. Some economists
who tried to nd a political economy explanation to redistribution issues were
concerned with the schedule that emerges in a political equilibrium, with the
prior question as to whether an equilibrium exists (Boadway and Keen, 2000).
First works using the Median Voter Theorem failed to achieve this goal, because
of the impossibility of nding a Condorcet winner. Since single-peakedness of
preferences on tax rates is a su¢ cient condition to nd a median voter equi-
librium, the conditions for the existence of single-peaked preferences must be
examined. Itsumi (1974) demonstrated that the non-single-peakedness of utility
curves is more likely to arise when the dispersion of ability is larger and the pref-
erence for leisure is greater and it happens to individuals just below the average
ability class. Romer (1975) demonstrated that single-peakedness condition is
achievable only in a situation where unemployment does not exist. If this is not
the case the size of the work force changes as the tax rate changes; and so the
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behaviour of all of the interesting variables becomes crucially dependent on the
entire skill distribution. As a result, the hypothesis of single-peakedness for all
individuals is no longer guaranteed. Nevertheless, Roberts (1977) demonstrated
that a Condorcet winner exists even if the single-peakedness condition is not
satised; it is su¢ cient that preferences satisfy the hierarchical adherence con-
dition, that is that there exists an ordering of individuals such that the pre-tax
income is monotonically increasing irrespective of the tax schedule. More re-
cently, Gans and Smart (1996) demonstrated that the existence of a Condorcet
winner is guaranteed by the Mirrlees-Spence single-crossing condition. Never-
theless, all approaches using the Median Voter Theorem fail once we assume
that voters vote over multi-dimensional issues. Furthermore, the hierarchical
adherence condition seems to be particularly restrictive, since it does not allow
for the possibility that an individual may dislike a small increase in the marginal
tax rate if this increase causes a large reduction in his labour supply but may
prefer further increases if his labour supply function entails a small decrease of
labour under that rate.
Instead, probabilistic voting models support the existence of multi-dimensional
policies and thus they are more suitable in explaining political equilibria. Cough-
lin (1986), Lindbeck and Weibull (1987,1993) studied a problem of redistribu-
tion using probabilistic voting with lump-sum transfers. An interesting result
achieved by these models states that the lower the loyalty of a voter for a party,
the more generous the transfer he gets. In political economy literature these
less loyal individuals are called swing voters in order to denote their proclivity
to swing from one party to another as a consequence of a small change in policy.
Unfortunately, as explained by Canegrati (2006), lump-sum taxation is never
used in practise, while the distribution of income takes always place via income
taxation.
In this paper I use the Probabilistic Voting Theory in order to explain why, in
the real world, the use of direct taxation may not necessarily lead to an increase
in equity. Exploiting the framework suggested by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980),
but moving from the hypothesis that political candidates are not benevolent
but simple voter-seekers, I will demonstrate that, in order to win elections,
a candidate must favour the most powerful or "single-minded" groups. That
is, those groups which, due to their idiosyncratic preference for leisure, are
more able to focalise on leisure have a stronger political power and are more
inuencing in determine the outcome of policies. Should these single-minded
components be located amongst the richest individuals of society, we would
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achieve an equilibrium where direct taxation is no longer an instrument to reduce
inequality, but a tool which increases it, favouring the most powerful group.
2 A model of direct taxation
I consider a society divided in H groups, indexed by h = 1; :::;H. Groups have
size fh, and their members are perfectly identical. Two political candidates,
j = D;R, run for an election. Both candidates have an ideological label (for
example, Democrats and Republicans), exogenously given. Voterswelfare de-
pends on two components; the rst is deterministic and it is represented by con-
sumption, whilst the second is stochastic and derives from personal attributes
of candidates.
I assume that each individual in group h derives his consumption from only
one good. The stochastic component is captured by expression DR 

h + &

,
where the indicator function
DR =
(
1 if R wins
0 if D wins
Term & Q 0 reects candidate Rs popularity amongst the electorate and it is
realized between the announcement of policies and elections. It is not idiosyn-
cratic and it is uniformly distributed
&  U

 1
2
;
1
2

with mean zero. Otherwise, term h Q 0 represents an idiosyncratic compo-
nent which measures voterspreferences for candidate R. It cannot be perfectly
observed by candidates and it is uniformly distributed
h  U

  1
2sh
;
1
2sh

again with mean zero and density sh.
Hence, each individual in group h has the following utility function
Uh = U

ch; lh; h

+DR 

h + &

(1)
where ch denotes consumption, lh labour and  h is a parameter which cap-
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tures the preference of groups for leisure. The utility function is increasing in
consumption and decreasing in labour. The labour income is given by Ih = wlh
where w denotes the real wage, equal for every group. Income is taxed ac-
cording to a linear taxation T (Ih) =  Xjh + tjIh, Xjh > 0 represents a xed
subsidy and tj is the marginal tax rate on labour. In the absence of savings,
consumption of individuals may be written as
ch = Xjh +
 
1  tjwlh (2)
I introduce now three useful denition1
Denition 1 (Single-mindedness) group A is said to be more single-minded
than group B with respect to leisure if the weight assigned by A is greater than
the weight assigned by B. That is, if  A >  B.
Denition 2 (Political power) group A is said to be more politically powerful
than group B if its density is higher than Bs. That is if sA > sB.
Denition 3 the density function of a group is monotonically increasing in the
amount of leisure. That is sh = s(lh), with @s
h
@lh
> 0.
Substituting 2 in 1, we may write the following maximisation problem:
max
flhg
U

Xjh +
 
1  tjwlh; lh; h+DR  h + &
whose resolution yields the optimal choice for leisure lh = l
 
Xjh;
 
1  tjw
and the Indirect Utility Function
V

Xjh;
 
1  tjw; h = (3)
= U

Xjh +
 
1  tjwlh  Xjh;  1  tjw ; lh  Xjh;  1  tjw ; h
Candidates maximize the probability of winning elections under the balanced-
budget constraint
X
h
fh
 
tjwlh  Xjh = 0
They realize that the choice on tax rates modies individualschoice on the
amount of labour to supply. Deriving 3 with respect to Xjh and tj we obtain
1For a more in details explanation of these denitions, see Canegrati (2006)
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@V h
@Xjh
= h and @V
h
@tj =  hwlh, where h represents the marginal utility of
income for group h. Candidates must choose an optimal policy vector j =
tj ; Xj1; :::; XjH
 2 j  RH+1.
The Lagrangian function for candidate j is
Lj = 1
2
+
d
s
X
h
fhsh

V
 
j
  V   j+ j  X
h
fh
 
tjwlh  Xjh! (4)
Referring to Canegrati (2006)2 we may write rst order conditions in the
following fashion8>>>>><>>>>>:
@Lj
@Xjh
= ds
P
h
shfhh + j
P
h

tjw @l
h
@Xjh
  n

= 0
@Lj
@tj =  ds
P
h
shfhhwlh + j
P
h

tjw @l
h
@tj  
P
h
wlh

= 0
@Lj
@j =
P
h
fh
 
tjwlh  Xjh = 0
Dividing @L
j
@Xjh
by j we obtain
@Lj
@Xjh
=
d
js
X
h
shfhh +
X
h

 jw
@lh
@Xjh
  n

= 0
Di¤erentiating lh with respect to tj we obtain @l
h
@tj =  @l
h
@w . Applying the
Slutzky decomposition we obtain @l
h
@w =
@lhc
@w +
@lh
@Xjh
lh, where @l
hc
@w > 0 represents
the compensative variation of labour supply. Substituting in @L
j
@tj , we obtain
@Lj
@tj
=  d
s
X
h
shfhhwlh+j
(X
h
 
tjw

 

@lhc
@w
+
@lh
@Xjh
lh

+
X
h
wlh
!)
= 0
(5)
and rearranging terms
@Lj
@tj
=  
X
h

d
s
shfhh + jtjw
@lh
@Xjh

wlh+ (6)
+j
tj
1  tj
X
h
lhw

   1  tj@lhc
@w
1
lh

+ j
X
h
wlh = 0
Let us dene jh := w
 
1  tj @lhc@w 1lh as the compensated elasticity of
2 see Proposition 6 and Corollary 7
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labour price for group h and re-write 6 as
@Lj
@tj
=  
X
h

d
s
shfhh + jtjw
@lh
@Xjh

wlh j t
j
1  tj
X
h
lhwjh+j
X
h
wlh = 0
(7)
Furthermore, let us impose 'h := dss
hfhh + jtjw @l
h
@Xjh
, Ih = wlh and substi-
tute again in 7 we obtain
@Lj
@tj
=  
X
h
'hIh   j t
j
1  tj
X
h
Ihjh + j
X
h
Ih = 0 (8)
Re-arranging terms we obtain the following expression:
tj
1  tj =
P
h
Ih  P
h
'hIhP
h
Ihjh
(9)
where ' :=
P
h
'h
n . Finally we obtain
tj
1  tj =
nI' P
h
'hIhP
h
Ihjh
=  cov
 
'h; Ih
P
h
Ihjh
(10)
where I represents the average income. The covariance on the right hand
side of 10 is made by terms 'h and Ih. 'h represents the candidate marginal
probability of income in group h and it is composed by two terms
1. dss
hfhh which measures by how much an increase in the utility of a group
a¤ects the probability of winning elections at the margin and represents
the weight attached to a change in individuals income by candidates. This
weight is greater for more single-minded groups if the function expressing
the probability of winning elections is strictly concave. Notice that h is
greater for the poorest individuals, because marginal utility of income is
decreasing with respect to income. Nevertheless, the poor do not get more
favourable taxation than the rich if their political power is not su¢ cient
to capture politicians;
2. the e¤ect of an extra-dollar on revenues, weighted by  which translates
a change in revenues in the probability of winning.
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Let us now analyse 10 starting from the left-hand side. Notice that
@
@tj

tj
1  tj

=
1
(1  tj)2 > 0
As a consequence, the tax rate is higher the higher is the right-hand side.
Proposition 4 the tax rate is lower the higher is the political power of the social
group.
Proof. notice that expression t
j
1 tj is lower the higher is '
h. The political
power of a group is captured by the expression dss
hfh, since the higher the size
and the density of a group, the higher the power of its inuence as a consequence
of a variation in the redistribution policy chosen by the Government.
3 A model with income heterogeneity
Suppose now that the segmentation of society in groups is made according to
two dimensions: preferences for leisure and wages. That is, individuals di¤er
also for their levels of income. Then, I suppose that the constituency may be
clustered in H K groups, where H represents the number of groups obtained
by clustering the population with respect to preference for leisure and K the
number of groups obtained by clustering with respect to labour income. Thus,
each individual belongs to a cluster fh; kg, where h = 1; :::;H indexes groups
according to the preference of individuals for leisure and k = 1; :::;K indexes
groups according individuals income. The deterministic component of utility
of an individual h; k is written as:
Uh;k = U

ch;k; lh;k; h

(11)
and the consumption
ch;k = Xjh;k +
 
1  tjwklh;k (12)
The stochastic component is captured by expression DR 

h + k + &

,
which this time encompasses another idiosyncratic variable, k. The two idio-
syncratic variables are uniformly distributed on intervals
  1
2sh
; 1
2sh

and
  1
2sk
; 1
2sk

,
respectively. Variable h captures political preferences of voters according to
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their preferences for leisure, whilst variable k captures the political preferences
of voters according to their labour income. For example, a voter in the cluster
fh; kg may prefer candidate D to candidate R for the rst dimension, because
the former chooses a policy which better reects his needs for leisure, but in the
same breath may prefer candidate R to candidate D for the second dimension
because it chooses a policy which strongly protects his income.
The new maximisation problem may be written as
max
flh;kg
Uh;k

Xjh;k +
 
1  tjwklh;k; lh;k; h+DR  h + k + &
Candidates maximise the following Lagrangian function
Lj = 1
2
+
d
s1s2
X
h
X
k
fh;kshsk

V
 
j
  V   j+ (13)
j
 X
h
X
k
fh;k
 
tjwk
 
1  lh;k Xjh;k!
where s1 :=
P
h
shfh and s2 :=
P
k
skfk.
First order conditions are
8>>>>><>>>>>:
@Lj
@Xjh;k
= ds1s2
P
h
P
k
shfh;kh;k + j
P
h
P
k

tjwk @l
h;k
@Xjh;k
  n

= 0
@Lj
@tj =   ds1s2
P
h
P
k
shfh;kh;kwklh;k + j
P
h
P
k

tjwk @l
h;k
@tj  
P
h
P
k
wklh;k

= 0
@Lj
@j =
P
h
P
k
fh;k
 
tjwklh;k  Xjh;k = 0
Again exploiting the Roy identity and the Slutzky decomposition we can
re-write the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to the tax rate as follows
@Lj
@tj
=   d
s1s2
X
h
X
k
shskfh;khwklh;k+ (14)
j
(X
h
X
k
 
tjwk

 

@lh;kc
@wk
+
@lh;k
@Xjh;k
lh;k

+
X
h
X
k
wklh;k
!)
= 0
and re-arranging terms we obtain
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@Lj
@tj =  
P
h
P
k

d
s1s2 s
hskfh;khwklh;k + jtjwk @l
h;k
@Xjh;k

wklh;k+
j t
j
1 tj
P
h
P
k
wklh;k
h
   1  tj @lh;kc
@wk
 1
lh;k
i
+ j
P
h
P
k
wklh;k = 0
Let us dene 'h;k := ds1s2 s
hskfh;kh + jtjwk @l
h;k
@Xjh;k
and substitute we
obtain:
tj
1  tj =
P
h
P
k
Ih;k  P
h
P
k
'h;kIh;kP
h
P
k
Ih;kjh;k
(15)
And dening ' :=
P
h
P
k
'h;k
n we nally obtain
tj
1  tj =
nI' P
h
P
k
'h;kIh;kP
h
P
k
Ih;kjh;k
=  cov
 
'h;k; Ih;k
P
h
P
k
Ih;kjh;k
(16)
This time, the mindedness of individuals is two-dimensional and thus, the
political power of groups depends on the combination of the two mindedness.
Notice that density functions enter 'h;k in a multiplicative way, meaning that a
weak-minded group on a dimension may reinforce its total mindedness thanks
to being strong-minded on the other dimension. Nevertheless, the main achieve-
ment of the Single-mindedness Theory still holds; the tax rate will be lower the
higher is the political power of the group, since t
j
1 tj is lower the higher '
h;k.
This allows us to a¢ rm that results of the theory, which a¢ rms that more
single-minded groups are the most favoured groups by a taxation policy, are
robust even in a multi-dimensional space.
4 Measuring income inequality at a microeco-
nomic level
We now have all the elements to measure how groupswelfare is a¤ected by the
decisions taken by self-interested candidates who choose their taxation policy
in order to maximise the probability of winning elections. The goal of this
section is twofold: measuring the di¤erence in the level of inequality amongst
age groups and analysing the relation between this inequality and the structure
of taxations systems. To the best of my knowledge this is the rst attempt to
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measure the cohort-specic inequality and the rst time that the Gini index is
disaggregated at a microeconomic level in order to capture in a more precise way
the di¤erences in inequality amongst social groups. In other words, I suggest
that the Gini index measured at a macroeconomic level to capture the general
inequality levels of countries, is the result of many Gini indexes calculated at
a microeconomic level. Calculating Gini indexes at a microeconomic levels
allows us to evaluate more precisely the impact of the Governments policies
on groupswelfare, something which cannot be made by using the Gini index
calculated at a country level.
The question addressed is: which are the age groups which are a­ icted by
the highest degree of inequalitity? In order to answer this question we must
remember that inequality measurement is always an attempt to give meaning
to comparisons of income distributions in terms of criteria which may be derived
from ethical principles, appealing mathematical constructs or simple intuition
(Cowell, 2000). As a consequence, before measuring the level of inequality in
practise it is necessary to dene the concepts, the ranking criteria and the indices
necessary to achieve our goal.
4.1 Distributional and Ranking concepts
I will denote by z the space of all univariate probability distributions with
support   <;x 2  represents a particular value of income and F 2 z one
of the possible income distribution. So F (x  ex) represents the proportion
of population with income less than ex. Furthermore dene x := inf () and
denote by z (%)  z a subset with given mean % : z 7! < given by
% (F ) :=
Z
xdF (x) (17)
and f : 0 7! < as a density function, supposed that F is continuous over
some intervals 0  . Furthermore, in order to compare distributions, I as-
sume the existence of a complete and transitive binary relation <Ion z, called
inequality ordering and represented by I : F 7! <, if the ordering is continuous.3
In order to compare distributions we also need some ranking criteria over z.
I use the notation <T to indicate the ranking induced by a comparison principle
T . Three possible situations arise:
3 I assume that axioms of Anonymity, Population Principle, Principle of Transfers,
Monotonicity, Scale Invariance, Decomposability, Uniform income growth and Translation
Invariance (Cowell, 2000) are satised.
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Denition 5 For all F;G 2 z :
(a) (strict dominance) G T F , G <T F ^ F= <T G:
(b) (equivalence) G T F , G <T F ^ F <T G:
(c) (non-comparability) G ?T F , G= <T F ^ F= <T G:
Suppose now to focus on the concept of social-welfare function, expressed in
the following additively separable form:
W (F ) =
Z
u (x) dF (x) (18)
where u : z 7! < is an evaluation function. Denote by W^1 the subclass
of SWFs where u is increasing and by W^2 the subclass of W^1 where u is also
concave. Furthermore, dene the set of age years A where a is a given age in
A. Finally, introduce the following
Denition 6 For all F 2 z, a 2 A and for all 0  q  1, the quantile
functional for a given age year is dened by
Q (F ; (q; a)) = inf fxjF (x)  q; ag = xqa (19)
This denition enables us to state the theorem of rst-order distributional
dominance
Theorem 7 G <Q F , W (G) W (F ) 8

W 2 W^1

Otherwise, if we consider this other
Denition 8 For all F 2 z, a 2 A and for all 0  q  1, the cumulative
income functional for a given age year is dened by
C (F ; (q; a)) :=
Z Q(F ;(q;a))
x
xdF (x) (20)
4
which leads us to the theorem of second-order distributional dominance
Theorem 9 8F;G 2 z (%) : G <C F , W (G) W (F ) 8

W 2 W^2

4The graph C (F ; q) against q describes the generalised Lorenz curve
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Suppose now that a distribution depends on the e¤ects of a policy p 2 P ,
where P is the space of all the possible policies. Without loss of generality, I
suppose that P =

p1; p2
	
. Suppose also that distribution F is obtained under
policy p1 and distribution G is obtained under policy p2. We may denote by
F = F
 
p1; a

and G = G
 
p2; a

the distribution obtained under the two policies
for a given age group a.
We want to dene a comparison criterion for judging policies and their e¤ects
on the distribution of age groups.
Theorem 10 (First-order distributional dominance) For all p1; p2 2 P , a 2 A :
p1 <Q p2 , W
 
F
 
p1; a
 W  G  p2; a 8W 2 W^1
Theorem 11 (Second-order distributional dominance) For all p1; p2 2 P , a 2
A; F;G 2 z (%) : p1 <C p2 , W
 
F
 
p1; a
 W  G  p2; a 8W 2 W^2
These two theorems simply state that a policy q1 is preferred to policy q2 if
and only if the welfare obtained under the distribution it generates
is higher than the welfare obtained under the distribution generated
by the other policy for every age group. Notice that this condition must
hold for every age group; that means that we should see an improvement in wel-
fare of all cohorts.
4.2 Decomposition indices
The Generalised Entropy measure is the more suitable index to analyse inequal-
ity within and between groups because of its decomposability. It may be written
as
GE () =
within group inequalityz }| {Z
h
fh
xh
x

Ih () +
between group inequalityz }| {
Ibet () (21)
where
Ibet () =
1
 (  1)
Z
h
fh
xh
x

  1

(22)
The  in 22 is a parameter that characterises di¤erent members of the GE
class: a high positive value of  yields an index that is very sensitive to income
transfers at the top of the distribution. In particular, GE (0) represents the
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mean logarithmic deviation, GE (1) the Theil index, and GE (2) the half of
square of the coe¢ cient of variation.
Another useful indicator to measure the inequality between groups is repre-
sented by Gini:
G = 1 +
1
N
 

2
N2x
 Z
h
(N   h+ 1)xh

(23)
where N =
R
wh; wh = f
hN . When data are unweighted, wh = 1 and
N = H. Individuals are ranked in ascending order of h.
5 Empirical evidence from the Luxemburg In-
come Study
5.1 Dataset
The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) is a panel database including 30 coun-
tries and made by 5 waves of data from 1979  2002. The source of data is
represented by country specic household income surveys. For example, indi-
vidual data from the United States is taken from the Current Population Sur-
vey. Datasets are identied by a code made by two letters denoting a country
and two numbers which identify the wave of data. For instance, US00 iden-
ties the wave 2000 for the United States. I used data of 17 countries (here
with the relative LIS codes): Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Czech
Republic (CZ), Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE),
Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland
(IE), Israel (IL), Italy (IT), Luxemburg (LU), Mexico (MX), Netherlands (NL),
Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Romania (RO), Russia (RU), Slovak Republic (SK),
Slovenia (SI), Sweden (SE), Taiwan (TW), United Kingdom (UK) and United
States (US).
The dataset includes data at an individual or household level, on demo-
graphics, expenditure, income, labor market outcomes and tax variables.
Inequality indexes were calculated using the denition of disposable income,
calculated as follows:
disposable income = compensation of employees + gross self-employment
income + realised property income + occupational pensions5 + other
5Occupational pensions include all pensions paid from non-social retirement schemes in-
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cash income6 + social insurance cash transfers7 + universal cash transfers8 +
social assistance9 - direct taxes - social security contributions
This choice is natural because the disposable income allows us to assess the
impact of taxation on individualswelfare and thus to evaluate the degree of
inequality as a result of the candidateschoice.
5.2 Cohort-specic inequality
In order to assess the level of inequality amongst cohorts I used the Jenkins
Stata routine ineqdec0 which estimates a range of inequality and related in-
dices (Generalized Entropy of class a, Atkinson class A(e), the Gini coe¢ cient
and the percentile ratios), plus decompositions of a subset of these indices by
population subgroups. Calculations do not exclude values less than or equal
to zero. Appendix 1 reports an example of results for the Generalized Entropy
index of class 2 and the Gini index calculated for Austria10 . Here I will briey
provide a description of data analysing the evolution of the indexes over time
for every country.
1. Austria. It is characterised by a low level of inequality, with the average
Gini index equal to 0.29 in 2000, lower then the levels reached in previous
years. The maximum value of the Gini index was reached in 1995 (0.33)
and since than it is decreased. The country has always been characterised
for higher levels of inequality amongst the older cohorts, especially for
individuals aged over 50.
2. Belgium. The country is characterised by a low level of inequality, with
the Gini indexes constantly lower than 0.3. Nevertheless, the index worsen
from 0.26 reached in 1985 to 0.286 in 2000. Nevertheless, in 2000 the
situation had a more equitable distribution amongst cohorts, whilst before
the inequality was more concentrated amongst elder cohorts.
cluding employer-based pensions for private sector workers and public employees.
6Other cash income includes regular private transfers, alimony and child support benets,
other sources of regular cash income, not classied above.
7Social insurance transfers include: accident or short-term disability pay, long-term dis-
ability pay, social retirement benets (old age and survivors), unemployment pay, maternity
allowances, military or veterans benes, other social insurance.
8Universal cash transfers include child and/or family allowances if paid directly by govern-
ments. Universal cash transfers paid as refundable income tax credits are counted as negative
amounts in the income tax of some countries.
9Social assistance includes all income-tested and means-tested benets, both cash and
near-cash.
10 Inter-generational indexes for all the other countries are available upon request to the
author.
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3. Canada. Canada has characterised by a medium level of inequality, with
the Gini index which remained all in all steady over time. The higher
levels of the Gini index is concentrated amongst the younger cohorts and
the individuals aged over 45, even though these di¤erences with respect
to the average are not particularly high.
4. Switzerland. The inequality in Switzerland has been soundly reduced since
1982, when the Gini index was equal to 0.35, much higher than the same
value calculated in 2000 (0.264). Wealth is well distributed amongst co-
horts and we almost never observe values above 0.4. A slight increase in
inequality levels is observable amongst people between 60 and 70, but still
these values are not particularly high.
5. Czech Republic. The country is characterised by a low level of inequality
and a very fair distribution of wealth amongst cohorts. The very low level
of the variance (0.001) states that the di¤erence from a cohort to another
is minimal and we never observe values of the Gini index above 0.4.
6. Germany. The level of inequality is low, even though we observe a slight
increase in the Gini index from 1984 to 2000. The distribution of wealth is
very fair, and even amongst the younger and older components of society
we do not observe radical changes with respect to the average.
7. Denmark. Denmark is characterised by a very low level of inequality,
with an exception represented by 1995 when the Gini index was equal
to 0.361. Nevertheless, we observe that amongst younger cohorts the
inequality increases.
8. Spain. The country is characterised by a medium level of inequality and
the situation remained all in all steady over years. The inequality increases
when we consider people aged 60 and this situation has worsen in 2000.
9. Finland. The level of inequality is low, even though the situation has
worsen since 1995. The wealth is well distributed amongst cohorts, with
a slight increase in the values of the Gini index for individuals in their
fties.
10. Hungary. Like others former communist countries, the situation in Hun-
gary in characterised by a general low level of inequality which has re-
mained steady over the 1990s and by a well distribution of wealth amongst
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di¤erent cohorts, with values of the Gini index which are almost never
higher than 0.4. In particular this feature has improved since the begin-
ning of the 1990s.
11. Greece. We do not have data in order to make a comparison, but still the
situation of Greece is characterised by a medium level of inequality, with
a general increase in the level of inequality amongst the younger and the
elder cohorts.
12. Ireland. Ireland is characterised by a medium level of inequality. The situ-
ation has slightly improved since the end of the 1980s. The wealth is well
distributed amongst cohorts, with higher levels of inequality observable
amongst the elder components of society.
13. Israel. Inequality in Israel is particularly worsen since the end of the 1970s,
with the Gini index which increased from 0.29 to 0.36. Nevertheless, if
we analyse the redistribution of wealth amongst cohorts we may record
an improvement during the recent years, where we do not observe great
di¤erences amongst cohorts, even though the level of the Gini index are
slightly higher for elder cohorts.
14. Italy. Italy is characterised by a medium level of inequality. The situation
is worsen over years and the Gini index has increased from 0.315 in 1986 to
0.356 in 2000. The country is characterised by the harmful phenomenon
of the increase in the inequality amongst younger cohorts which, on aver-
age, has doubled or tripled (depending on the cohort analysed) in 2000.
Di¤erences are observable also amongst elder cohorts, even tough not in
the same manner as for the younger.
15. Luxemburg. The country is characterised by a very low level of inequality,
which has remained steady over time. The wealth is very well distributed
amongst cohorts and the variance is amongst the lowest we observed.
16. Mexico. Mexico has one of the worse values of the Gini index. Over years
the indicator has always been higher than 0.4, with values even higher than
0.5 in 1990s. The situation does not seem to be improved and we record
very high level of the Gini index, sometimes higher than 0.6, especially
amongst elder cohorts.
17. The Netherlands. The country is characterised by a very low level of in-
equality and the Gini index has improved from the 1980s, with a signicant
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improvement in 2000. The distributions of wealth amongst cohorts is very
good, especially recently, and we do not observe any worsening in the Gini
index amongst elder components of society.
18. Norway. Norway has a medium level of inequality, which is signicantly
improved since the end of the 1970s when the Gini index was equal to 0.46,
even though the situation is worsening in recent years. As other Scandi-
navian countries, also Norway has a very fair redistribution of wealth
amongst cohorts and this situation has been preserved over years.
19. Poland. Poland is characterised by a low level of inequality and the Gini
index has improved recently with respect to the previous years. Like other
former communist countries, wealth is well distributed amongst cohorts,
since the variance is very low (0.001).
20. Romania. The country is characterised by a medium level of inequality
and by a well distribution of wealth amongst cohorts.
21. Russia. The situation in Russia is particularly negative, especially if we
consider that the country has one of the worst value for the Gini index
(0.42 in 2000). It has also a bad distribution of wealth amongst cohorts,
with a variance which is ten times the variance that we observe in Scan-
dinavian countries. Unlike the other countries, Russia is characterised by
having high Gini index concentrated amongst middle generations, whilst
the values of the index are lower amongst the elder components of society.
22. Sweden. Like the other Scandinavian countries, also Sweden has relatively
low levels of inequality which has remained steady over time and a very
good distribution of wealth amongst cohorts, with values of the Gini index
which are slightly higher for younger cohorts.
23. Slovak Republic. The country is characterised by a low level of inequality
and a very good distribution of wealth amongst generations. In particular,
observe that the level of variance (0.0009) is the lowest observed in our
dataset.
24. Slovenia. Although we do not have many observations we may say that the
country is characterised by low levels of inequality and a good distribution
of wealth amongst cohorts.
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25. Taiwan. The country is characterised by a medium level of inequality,
even though the situation is worsened over the recent years. The country
has always been characterised by higher levels of inequality amongst elder
cohorts, especially for individuals aged 60.
26. United Kingdom. The country is characterised by a medium level of in-
equality, even though the situation has steadily worsened since the end of
the 1960s. The distribution of wealth amongst cohorts is all in all good,
but especially over the last year we observe a worsening in the Gini index
amongst individuals aged 50.
27. United States. The country is characterised by a medium level of inequality
and by a worsening in the level of distribution, even though the phenom-
enon has not reached the magnitude achieved by the United Kingdom.
The system is fair and we do not observe particular spike in the distribu-
tion of wealth amongst cohorts.
5.3 Empirical Framework
In order to evaluate if and how the cohort-specic inequality depends on the
structure of taxation system I run a regression using the gini index calculated
by using the Jenkinsroutine for every age group as dependent variable. The
regressors are both variables which capture the characteristics of the taxation
system and some control variables, such as the GDP growth rate, unemploy-
ment rate and consumer price index (CPI). Regressions were made only for 17
countries (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain,
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Mexico, Norway, Sweden,
United States) because of the absence of data for the other countries, for year
2000. The specication of the model is the following
gini = 0 + 1ttw + 2tmpit+ 3nptdi+ 4gdp99+ (24)
+5ur99 + 6cpi99 + 6+g
61X
g=1
dg + "t
where
gini= age group Gini index (2000)
ttw is variable indicating the total tax wedge which may be one of the
following:
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ttw67 = Total tax wedge as a 67% of Average Wage; marginal personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income
ttw100 = Total tax wedge as a 100% of Average Wage; marginal personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income
ttw133 = Total tax wedge as a 133% of Average Wage; marginal personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income
ttw167 = Total tax wedge as a 167% of Average Wage; marginal personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income
attw67 = Total tax wedge as a 67% of Average Wage; average personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income
attw100 = Total tax wedge as a 100% of Average Wage; average personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income
attw133 = Total tax wedge as a 133% of Average Wage; average personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income
attw167 = Total tax wedge as a 167% of Average Wage; average personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income
tmpit = Top marginal personal income tax rates for employee (combined)
nptdi = Net personal Tax; overall statutory tax rates on dividend income
gdp99 = GDP Growth Rate 1999
ur99 = Unemployment rate 1999
cpi99 = Consumer price index 1999
dg = dummy for age group g
The marginal and average tax rates "all-in" for employees includes personal
income tax and employee social security contributions and less cash benets,
for a single individual without children at di¤erent income levels. Marginal tax
rates measure how much of the extra wage income an individual worker keeps
after taxes, whilst average tax rates measure how much total net income after
tax changes if one decides to join (or exit from) the labour market (OECD,
2004).
The taxation of personal capital income varies substantially amongst OECD
countries because some of them tax all personal capital income at a at rate and
wage and pensions at progressive rates (Dual-income tax); in other countries the
taxation is progressive and the capital is taxed at more or less the same rates as
labour (comprehensive income tax systems); nally in some countries we observe
a semi-dual income taxation of capital income, since some capital is taxed at
lower rates than wage income. Due to these di¤erences, the OECD has chosen
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to use the taxation of dividends as a proxy for the taxation of capital, in order
to allow for comparability. Appendix 2 reports the results of regressions and
relative graphics of coe¢ cients betas.
The total tax wedge and overall statutory tax rates on dividend income are
always statistically signicant at 1 per cent of the signicant interval, meaning
that these two variables have a great explanatory power for the cohort-specic
inequality. More controversial is the evidence about the top marginal personal
income tax rates for employee; this variable is signicant at 5 per cent of the
condence interval only when we use the total tax wedge as a 133 and 167 per
cent of the average wage with marginal personal income tax and as a 167 per
cent of the average wage with average personal income tax.
As for the age groups dummies, we can observe that, most of the times, they
are statistically signicant at 1 per cent of the condence interval for young
cohorts; otherwise, they are never signicant for old cohorts (especially for in-
dividuals aged 50 or more).
Therefore, overall results shows the existence of a strong relation between the
taxation system and the inequality amongst age-groups, especially for younger
individuals.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper I analysed a probabilistic voting model of direct taxation where
self-interested governments set their policies in order to maximise the probability
of winning elections. Society is divided into groups who have di¤erent prefer-
ences for the consumption of leisure. The use of a probabilistic voting model
characterized by the presence of single-minded groups changes the classic results
of median voter models because it is no longer the level of income which drives
the equilibrium policies but the ability of groups to focus on leisure, instead.
This ability enables them to achieve a strong political power which candidates
cannot help going along with, because they would lose the elections otherwise.
I also show the robustness of the single-mindedness theory in a two-dimensional
setting, where individuals di¤er also for their levels of income, not only pref-
erence for leisure. Results from the Luxemburg Income Study corroborate the
theoretical results and show how goals in terms of cohort-specic inequality are
still very far from being reached in the real world.
Acknowledgement 12 I am particularly grateful to Mario Gilli, Frank Cow-
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7 Appendix 1
7.1
AUSTRIA
age gen2_AT81 gen2_AT87 gen2_AT94 gen2_AT95 gen2_AT97 gen2_AT00
19 0.27523 0.04553 0.22233 0.40876 0.20567 0
20 0.21493 0.08294 0.38405 0.47644 0.10894 0.02608
21 0.20278 0.13421 0.22409 0.39933 0.18989 0.12403
22 0.16485 0.14668 0.12977 0.26077 0.14164 0.26366
23 0.20968 0.13639 0.16412 0.35486 0.18645 0.16583
24 0.183 0.12371 0.16439 0.21554 0.12458 0.06911
25 0.12369 0.0986 0.12998 0.27466 0.14559 0.08143
26 0.13922 0.10477 0.1369 0.16417 0.10172 0.13755
27 0.13348 0.08437 0.27687 0.2169 0.07776 0.09473
28 0.12026 0.09914 0.12282 0.15547 0.11324 0.08929
29 0.11832 0.12484 0.12105 0.17941 0.16818 0.09229
30 0.10514 0.07123 0.12206 0.14645 0.07855 0.0828
31 0.12493 0.07577 0.13736 0.12271 0.13538 0.12616
32 0.12843 0.09248 0.11921 0.12224 0.14661 0.12119
33 0.12578 0.06034 0.09069 0.12836 0.06415 0.25269
34 0.11477 0.07832 0.13371 0.12119 0.05808 0.09634
35 0.11387 0.06752 0.07042 0.12258 0.18114 0.19637
36 0.10709 0.06045 0.36603 0.18879 0.07509 0.09409
37 0.10542 0.0819 0.11164 0.14147 0.08084 0.07739
38 0.12518 0.08893 0.16063 0.10928 0.06272 0.23582
39 0.1198 0.12965 0.28495 0.12378 0.22948 0.09471
40 0.11621 0.0734 0.19278 0.1259 0.09638 0.06439
41 0.11476 0.10087 0.09561 0.13351 0.12711 0.06265
42 0.14295 0.1029 0.11324 0.13888 0.3054 0.1261
43 0.11068 0.10255 0.10202 0.1121 0.13436 0.13967
44 0.1123 0.11499 0.29329 0.15698 0.09731 0.09694
45 0.14254 0.12846 0.13047 0.13542 0.25254 0.08503
46 0.14773 0.1432 0.09814 0.1402 0.10193 0.09825
47 0.15354 0.1382 0.3126 0.15642 0.17973 0.14639
48 0.14812 0.14279 0.14581 0.16197 0.12727 0.13686
49 0.1721 0.13782 0.11283 0.15114 0.12356 0.11355
50 0.16461 0.15592 0.19426 0.16682 0.20683 0.3045
51 0.17518 0.17292 0.18427 0.16892 0.14611 0.08092
52 0.17536 0.19792 0.13339 0.19878 0.15831 0.12516
53 0.14163 0.18818 0.2575 0.17703 0.14604 0.16831
54 0.17207 0.15597 0.317 0.17525 0.1299 0.26289
55 0.1933 0.19222 0.26579 0.20559 0.17101 0.07751
56 0.17301 0.15026 0.16685 0.20935 0.18652 0.15374
57 0.21078 0.23471 0.29849 0.18397 0.16035 0.19093
58 0.17809 0.14317 0.20851 0.19244 0.29088 0.1275
59 0.24858 0.19516 0.16402 0.19507 0.18774 0.16268
60 0.23237 0.1913 0.14822 0.22121 0.18515 0.2102
61 0.35633 0.27229 0.17028 0.18902 0.12613 0.36048
62 0.29752 0.20967 0.17248 0.23411 0.13744 0.225
63 0.25695 0.25638 0.39155 0.2236 0.16006 0.17547
64 0.2984 0.25927 0.14831 0.22759 0.18302 0.12149
65 0.30494 0.25167 0.24476 0.22662 0.20914 0.24762
66 0.2042 0.19542 0.1497 0.18072 0.15705 0.30201
67 0.34052 0.20299 0.1706 0.22394 0.182 0.28207
68 0.22707 0.16918 0.19639 0.20563 0.33885 0.17858
69 0.29017 0.18181 0.14626 0.21686 0.14935 0.1487923
70 0.16389 0.20754 0.2764 0.24003 0.13561 0.25692
71 0.21415 0.21932 0.18063 0.23711 0.20396 0.26261
72 0.23721 0.27098 0.18201 0.24913 0.2422 0.22027
73 0.24773 0.21071 0.24251 0.24612 0.25004 0.11828
74 0.33316 0.25256 0.30121 0.25233 0.13601 0.21595
75 0.08446 0.22245 0.16496 0.23895 0.23343 0.14067
76 0.31632 0.16431 0.25675 0.20827 0.34988 0.23612
77 0.25462 0.21869 0.30179 0.25463 0.27684 0.15107
78 0.2384 0.2024 0.0738 0.17864 0.26674 0.28586
79 0.32036 0.27349 0.30181 0.18722 0.18339 0.53275
80 0.29263 0.41491 0.23909 0.25137 0.18485 0.33009
81 0.18971 0.25238 0.3126 0.20594 0.20055 0.20875
82 0.34148 0.15121 0.64463 0.29873 0.34728 0.23852
83 0.30446 0.14992 0.14279 0.1739 0.22801 0.1129
84 0.18058 0.20339 0.26669 0.26928 0.13868 0.18779
85 0.26799 0.14716 0.81539 0.25191 0.26707 0.22778
mean 0.194701642 0.15986239 0.2104709 0.2031606 0.1713091 0.18750269
var 0.005348056 0.00467133 0.01461624 0.00489227 0.00465142 0.03411195
Generalised Entropy index of class 2 Austria
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AUSTRIA
age gini_AT81 gini_AT87 gini_AT94 gini_AT95 gini_AT97 gini_AT00
19 0.39331 0.165 0.32396 0.49366 0.34815 0
20 0.33342 0.21484 0.48782 0.53148 0.24158 0.12464
21 0.34635 0.2482 0.32848 0.49308 0.33878 0.26498
22 0.3138 0.30051 0.2892 0.39798 0.28853 0.38474
23 0.34377 0.2801 0.28641 0.4439 0.34479 0.31939
24 0.33223 0.2734 0.31163 0.36834 0.2854 0.20894
25 0.27054 0.25413 0.29086 0.36606 0.29696 0.22803
26 0.28121 0.2506 0.29161 0.3172 0.25754 0.29544
27 0.28693 0.23084 0.39289 0.33255 0.21966 0.24874
28 0.27475 0.24968 0.27362 0.29819 0.25888 0.2313
29 0.27253 0.22118 0.27959 0.32533 0.30598 0.23743
30 0.25192 0.21639 0.26879 0.28727 0.22515 0.23132
31 0.27494 0.22042 0.28066 0.27357 0.26008 0.26603
32 0.26382 0.23589 0.27455 0.27653 0.24352 0.25903
33 0.26459 0.19244 0.24022 0.27098 0.20338 0.32614
34 0.26383 0.21469 0.26214 0.26944 0.18455 0.2442
35 0.26658 0.20652 0.21277 0.27218 0.31182 0.29127
36 0.25672 0.19381 0.32719 0.30489 0.21418 0.22432
37 0.25394 0.22468 0.26349 0.27316 0.22032 0.21517
38 0.27302 0.22602 0.3012 0.25282 0.20128 0.32656
39 0.26937 0.2648 0.31238 0.26487 0.30128 0.24025
40 0.26547 0.21428 0.25922 0.27347 0.24307 0.19358
41 0.26022 0.24372 0.2396 0.27913 0.27366 0.19388
42 0.28717 0.25204 0.25477 0.28579 0.28737 0.26779
43 0.25601 0.23317 0.22375 0.26781 0.27716 0.29304
44 0.26522 0.26394 0.37591 0.31539 0.23653 0.24844
45 0.29626 0.28116 0.28151 0.29439 0.30746 0.23509
46 0.29664 0.28307 0.24653 0.29133 0.24389 0.23056
47 0.29704 0.28863 0.37568 0.30984 0.30803 0.26479
48 0.30311 0.29325 0.27717 0.30879 0.2858 0.27147
49 0.31757 0.29232 0.27142 0.30706 0.28039 0.26043
50 0.31804 0.31016 0.33211 0.31875 0.32616 0.3463
51 0.32003 0.31846 0.32179 0.32209 0.29315 0.21885
52 0.31062 0.33522 0.28635 0.34522 0.30501 0.28289
53 0.28966 0.33477 0.36788 0.32576 0.29033 0.29552
54 0.32434 0.30437 0.37261 0.32349 0.27981 0.34564
55 0.34286 0.32361 0.37072 0.34425 0.32273 0.22011
56 0.33244 0.30134 0.32016 0.34463 0.31008 0.31161
57 0.34206 0.3577 0.34199 0.33644 0.30323 0.32773
58 0.32809 0.30237 0.33627 0.33439 0.38825 0.28035
59 0.35688 0.33072 0.31582 0.34097 0.32636 0.31101
60 0.35154 0.32342 0.30133 0.34344 0.33323 0.33324
61 0.40119 0.34792 0.31025 0.327 0.28138 0.38135
62 0.40636 0.33541 0.32669 0.35504 0.2833 0.34629
63 0.37624 0.35783 0.38393 0.34128 0.27253 0.31462
64 0.38643 0.32938 0.29589 0.35342 0.31883 0.2694
65 0.34965 0.34863 0.3467 0.34904 0.34311 0.37096
66 0.32376 0.33048 0.2918 0.31964 0.29739 0.35958
67 0.39054 0.33276 0.30745 0.34469 0.31361 0.33097
68 0.34391 0.31334 0.33929 0.33509 0.40072 0.31957
69 0.37072 0.32545 0.27846 0.34646 0.30326 0.4507
25
70 0.29057 0.33147 0.35869 0.3553 0.28895 0.36374
71 0.31555 0.34256 0.31918 0.33555 0.34597 0.37462
72 0.34093 0.33963 0.33223 0.33968 0.35403 0.34496
73 0.34316 0.33162 0.35085 0.3432 0.34818 0.26466
74 0.3715 0.33968 0.38 0.3564 0.29269 0.33997
75 0.22339 0.33832 0.28789 0.33898 0.33405 0.30024
76 0.36109 0.29289 0.38212 0.33695 0.39371 0.34608
77 0.32062 0.32974 0.36341 0.3438 0.34286 0.29808
78 0.33052 0.30874 0.21323 0.33045 0.35599 0.35192
79 0.36176 0.33943 0.38749 0.31905 0.33698 0.46303
80 0.3174 0.34514 0.30635 0.34904 0.31509 0.37855
81 0.28384 0.33127 0.37685 0.34072 0.30976 0.31737
82 0.39251 0.26995 0.42346 0.35192 0.43507 0.37498
83 0.34346 0.26694 0.29686 0.30181 0.31937 0.23866
84 0.30677 0.30612 0.34138 0.32218 0.28217 0.306
85 0.33595 0.27948 0.45054 0.30442 0.3346 0.35994
mean 0.315472537 0.2863588 0.316761791 0.330851045 0.298165821 0.290544478
var 0.001848617 0.0023986 0.002868845 0.002566864 0.002360967 0.005210053
Gini index Austria
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8 Appendix 2
Gini index Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
ttw67 -0.26158 0.017453 -14.99 0(***) -0.29583 -0.22733
tmpit -0.03427 0.027968 -1.23 0.221 -0.08915 0.020615
nptdi -0.0014 0.000153 -9.14 0(***) -0.0017 -0.0011
gdpgr99 -0.00127 0.001235 -1.03 0.302 -0.0037 0.001148
ur99 0.004558 0.000538 8.47 0(***) 0.003501 0.005614
cpi99 0.003593 0.000571 6.29 0(***) 0.002472 0.004713
g1 -0.04796 0.044034 -1.09 0.276 -0.13437 0.038448
g2 -0.01879 0.032442 -0.58 0.563 -0.08246 0.044869
g3 0.002495 0.026636 0.09 0.925 -0.04977 0.054765
g4 -0.01684 0.02337 -0.72 0.471 -0.0627 0.02902
g5 -0.01278 0.023486 -0.54 0.587 -0.05887 0.03331
g6 -0.03823 0.022421 -1.71 0.088(*) -0.08223 0.005766
g7 -0.03082 0.022227 -1.39 0.166 -0.07444 0.012794
g8 -0.05092 0.020377 -2.5 0.013(**) -0.09091 -0.01094
g9 -0.04708 0.019986 -2.36 0.019(**) -0.0863 -0.00786
g10 -0.06087 0.019446 -3.13 0.002(***) -0.09903 -0.02271
g11 -0.0572 0.021709 -2.63 0.009(***) -0.0998 -0.0146
g12 -0.04536 0.020593 -2.2 0.028(**) -0.08577 -0.00495
g13 -0.05675 0.019982 -2.84 0.005(***) -0.09597 -0.01754
g14 -0.04373 0.022909 -1.91 0.057(*) -0.08868 0.001227
g15 -0.05049 0.020255 -2.49 0.013(**) -0.09024 -0.01074
g16 -0.03276 0.022496 -1.46 0.146 -0.0769 0.011389
g17 -0.03842 0.020263 -1.9 0.058(*) -0.07818 0.001342
g18 -0.04039 0.020145 -2.01 0.045(**) -0.07992 -0.00086
g19 -0.05085 0.021489 -2.37 0.018(**) -0.09302 -0.00868
g20 -0.04138 0.021431 -1.93 0.054(*) -0.08344 0.000677
g21 -0.04254 0.019101 -2.23 0.026(**) -0.08002 -0.00506
g22 -0.0427 0.020468 -2.09 0.037(**) -0.08287 -0.00254
g23 -0.04093 0.020344 -2.01 0.044(**) -0.08086 -0.00101
g24 -0.04215 0.021371 -1.97 0.049(**) -0.08409 -0.00021
g25 -0.0363 0.020695 -1.75 0.08(*) -0.07691 0.004308
g26 -0.04259 0.020543 -2.07 0.038(**) -0.08291 -0.00228
g27 -0.03686 0.021344 -1.73 0.084(**) -0.07874 0.005026
g28 -0.02599 0.021631 -1.2 0.23 -0.06843 0.016462
g29 -0.02117 0.021254 -1 0.319 -0.06288 0.020536
g30 -0.01459 0.0213 -0.69 0.493 -0.05639 0.027208
g31 -0.01491 0.020186 -0.74 0.46 -0.05452 0.024705
g32 -0.01456 0.020957 -0.69 0.487 -0.05569 0.026565
g33 -0.0216 0.021233 -1.02 0.309 -0.06327 0.020066
g34 -0.00826 0.019735 -0.42 0.676 -0.04699 0.030469
g35 -0.01953 0.020283 -0.96 0.336 -0.05933 0.020276
g36 0.015429 0.031929 0.48 0.629 -0.04723 0.078086
g37 -0.00274 0.021461 -0.13 0.898 -0.04485 0.039376
g38 0.01969 0.021875 0.9 0.368 -0.02324 0.062617
g39 0.041252 0.023599 1.75 0.081(*) -0.00506 0.087563
g40 0.013112 0.02005 0.65 0.513 -0.02623 0.052457
g41 0.023191 0.020628 1.12 0.261 -0.01729 0.06367
g42 0.020414 0.02242 0.91 0.363 -0.02358 0.06441
g43 0.015101 0.021085 0.72 0.474 -0.02628 0.056478
g44 0.028168 0.019497 1.44 0.149 -0.01009 0.066427
g45 0.01119 0.02246 0.5 0.618 -0.03288 0.055265
g46 0.024157 0.0225 1.07 0.283 -0.02 0.06831
27
g47 0.00951 0.020796 0.46 0.648 -0.0313 0.05032
g48 0.007551 0.021572 0.35 0.726 -0.03478 0.049883
g49 -0.00595 0.023663 -0.25 0.801 -0.05239 0.040482
g50 0.000394 0.023093 0.02 0.986 -0.04492 0.04571
g51 -0.01166 0.024581 -0.47 0.635 -0.0599 0.036578
g52 0.007726 0.022344 0.35 0.73 -0.03612 0.051572
g53 -0.00681 0.022707 -0.3 0.764 -0.05137 0.037745
g54 0.001128 0.022218 0.05 0.96 -0.04247 0.044729
g55 -0.00276 0.023866 -0.12 0.908 -0.04959 0.044079
g56 -0.0037 0.021853 -0.17 0.866 -0.04658 0.039183
g57 -0.01108 0.024447 -0.45 0.65 -0.05906 0.036892
g58 -0.01288 0.020855 -0.62 0.537 -0.05381 0.028046
g59 0.002195 0.024229 0.09 0.928 -0.04535 0.04974
g60 -0.00992 0.021595 -0.46 0.646 -0.05229 0.032461
g61 0.007792 0.029873 0.26 0.794 -0.05083 0.066414
cons 0.468766 0.024516 19.12 0(***) 0.420657 0.516875
Number of obs 1054
R-squared 0.4484
OLS Regression ttw67; (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.; (*)
signicant at 10% C.I.
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Gini index Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
ttw100 -0.24639 0.016318 -15.1 0(***) -0.27841 -0.21436
tmpit -0.02015 0.028762 -0.7 0.484 -0.07659 0.036295
nptdi -0.00136 0.000151 -9.02 0(***) -0.00166 -0.00106
gdpgr99 0.003968 0.001269 3.13 0.002(***) 0.001478 0.006457
ur99 0.003176 0.00054 5.88 0(***) 0.002117 0.004235
cpi99 0.003563 0.000567 6.28 0(***) 0.00245 0.004676
g1 -0.04796 0.044788 -1.07 0.284 -0.13585 0.039929
g2 -0.01879 0.033175 -0.57 0.571 -0.0839 0.046307
g3 0.002495 0.027212 0.09 0.927 -0.0509 0.055895
g4 -0.01684 0.023517 -0.72 0.474 -0.06299 0.02931
g5 -0.01278 0.024025 -0.53 0.595 -0.05992 0.034369
g6 -0.03823 0.022532 -1.7 0.09(*) -0.08245 0.005984
g7 -0.03082 0.02291 -1.35 0.179 -0.07578 0.014135
g8 -0.05092 0.02085 -2.44 0.015(**) -0.09184 -0.01001
g9 -0.04708 0.020652 -2.28 0.023(**) -0.0876 -0.00655
g10 -0.06087 0.020019 -3.04 0.002(***) -0.10015 -0.02158
g11 -0.0572 0.021831 -2.62 0.009(***) -0.10004 -0.01436
g12 -0.04536 0.021517 -2.11 0.035(**) -0.08758 -0.00313
g13 -0.05675 0.020206 -2.81 0.005(***) -0.0964 -0.0171
g14 -0.04373 0.02368 -1.85 0.065(*) -0.0902 0.00274
g15 -0.05049 0.020643 -2.45 0.015(**) -0.091 -0.00998
g16 -0.03276 0.02299 -1.42 0.155 -0.07787 0.012358
g17 -0.03842 0.020944 -1.83 0.067(*) -0.07952 0.00268
g18 -0.04039 0.02139 -1.89 0.059(*) -0.08237 0.001585
g19 -0.05085 0.022314 -2.28 0.023(**) -0.09464 -0.00706
g20 -0.04138 0.021515 -1.92 0.055(*) -0.0836 0.000842
g21 -0.04254 0.019674 -2.16 0.031(**) -0.08115 -0.00393
g22 -0.0427 0.020978 -2.04 0.042(**) -0.08387 -0.00154
g23 -0.04093 0.020789 -1.97 0.049(**) -0.08173 -0.00014
g24 -0.04215 0.021902 -1.92 0.055(*) -0.08513 0.000829
g25 -0.0363 0.021874 -1.66 0.097(*) -0.07923 0.006621
g26 -0.04259 0.021254 -2 0.045(**) -0.0843 -0.00089
g27 -0.03686 0.022275 -1.65 0.098(*) -0.08057 0.006852
g28 -0.02599 0.02293 -1.13 0.257 -0.07098 0.01901
g29 -0.02117 0.022379 -0.95 0.344 -0.06509 0.022744
g30 -0.01459 0.02246 -0.65 0.516 -0.05867 0.029484
g31 -0.01491 0.020868 -0.71 0.475 -0.05586 0.026042
g32 -0.01456 0.021726 -0.67 0.503 -0.0572 0.028075
g33 -0.0216 0.022239 -0.97 0.332 -0.06524 0.022039
g34 -0.00826 0.020788 -0.4 0.691 -0.04905 0.032536
g35 -0.01953 0.020734 -0.94 0.347 -0.06022 0.02116
g36 0.015429 0.032236 0.48 0.632 -0.04783 0.078689
g37 -0.00274 0.022781 -0.12 0.904 -0.04744 0.041967
g38 0.01969 0.022392 0.88 0.379 -0.02425 0.063631
g39 0.041252 0.024176 1.71 0.088(*) -0.00619 0.088694
g40 0.013112 0.020815 0.63 0.529 -0.02773 0.053959
g41 0.023191 0.020788 1.12 0.265 -0.0176 0.063985
g42 0.020414 0.02307 0.88 0.376 -0.02486 0.065686
g43 0.015101 0.021472 0.7 0.482 -0.02704 0.057236
g44 0.028168 0.020094 1.4 0.161 -0.01126 0.0676
g45 0.01119 0.022519 0.5 0.619 -0.033 0.05538
g46 0.024157 0.023924 1.01 0.313 -0.02279 0.071104
29
g47 0.00951 0.021409 0.44 0.657 -0.0325 0.051521
g48 0.007551 0.021926 0.34 0.731 -0.03548 0.050579
g49 -0.00595 0.024293 -0.25 0.806 -0.05363 0.041718
g50 0.000394 0.024138 0.02 0.987 -0.04697 0.047762
g51 -0.01166 0.025142 -0.46 0.643 -0.061 0.037678
g52 0.007726 0.022616 0.34 0.733 -0.03665 0.052107
g53 -0.00681 0.023343 -0.29 0.77 -0.05262 0.038993
g54 0.001128 0.022979 0.05 0.961 -0.04397 0.046222
g55 -0.00276 0.024664 -0.11 0.911 -0.05116 0.045646
g56 -0.0037 0.022248 -0.17 0.868 -0.04736 0.039959
g57 -0.01108 0.025256 -0.44 0.661 -0.06064 0.03848
g58 -0.01288 0.021683 -0.59 0.553 -0.05543 0.029669
g59 0.002195 0.025012 0.09 0.93 -0.04689 0.051277
g60 -0.00992 0.022064 -0.45 0.653 -0.05322 0.033382
g61 0.007792 0.02988 0.26 0.794 -0.05084 0.066427
cons 0.459757 0.024464 18.79 0(***) 0.41175 0.507764
Number of obs 1054
R-squared 0.4263
OLS Regression ttw100; (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.; (*)
signicant at 10% C.I.
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Gini index Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
ttw133 -0.24076 0.016967 -14.19 0(***) -0.27406 -0.20747
tmpit -0.0557 0.028137 -1.98 0.048(**) -0.11091 -0.00049
nptdi -0.00123 0.000152 -8.08 0(***) -0.00153 -0.00093
gdpgr99 0.003717 0.001212 3.07 0.002(***) 0.001338 0.006096
ur99 0.003761 0.000538 6.99 0(***) 0.002705 0.004817
cpi99 0.003329 0.000564 5.91 0(***) 0.002223 0.004436
g1 -0.04796 0.044732 -1.07 0.284 -0.13574 0.039818
g2 -0.01879 0.033071 -0.57 0.57 -0.08369 0.046102
g3 0.002495 0.02708 0.09 0.927 -0.05065 0.055637
g4 -0.01684 0.023416 -0.72 0.472 -0.06279 0.02911
g5 -0.01278 0.02354 -0.54 0.587 -0.05897 0.033416
g6 -0.03823 0.022497 -1.7 0.09(*) -0.08238 0.005916
g7 -0.03082 0.022752 -1.35 0.176 -0.07547 0.013825
g8 -0.05092 0.020532 -2.48 0.013(**) -0.09122 -0.01063
g9 -0.04708 0.020332 -2.32 0.021(**) -0.08697 -0.00718
g10 -0.06087 0.019983 -3.05 0.002(***) -0.10008 -0.02165
g11 -0.0572 0.02156 -2.65 0.008(***) -0.09951 -0.01489
g12 -0.04536 0.021093 -2.15 0.032(**) -0.08675 -0.00397
g13 -0.05675 0.020013 -2.84 0.005(***) -0.09603 -0.01748
g14 -0.04373 0.023231 -1.88 0.06(*) -0.08932 0.00186
g15 -0.05049 0.020468 -2.47 0.014(**) -0.09066 -0.01032
g16 -0.03276 0.022986 -1.43 0.154 -0.07786 0.012351
g17 -0.03842 0.020777 -1.85 0.065(*) -0.07919 0.002352
g18 -0.04039 0.021073 -1.92 0.056(*) -0.08175 0.000963
g19 -0.05085 0.02198 -2.31 0.021(**) -0.09398 -0.00772
g20 -0.04138 0.021363 -1.94 0.053(*) -0.0833 0.000543
g21 -0.04254 0.019571 -2.17 0.03(**) -0.08094 -0.00413
g22 -0.0427 0.021053 -2.03 0.043(**) -0.08402 -0.00139
g23 -0.04093 0.020659 -1.98 0.048(**) -0.08147 -0.0004
g24 -0.04215 0.021493 -1.96 0.05(**) -0.08433 2.73E-05
g25 -0.0363 0.02135 -1.7 0.089(*) -0.0782 0.005593
g26 -0.04259 0.020918 -2.04 0.042(**) -0.08364 -0.00154
g27 -0.03686 0.021777 -1.69 0.091(*) -0.07959 0.005875
g28 -0.02599 0.022451 -1.16 0.247 -0.07004 0.01807
g29 -0.02117 0.021984 -0.96 0.336 -0.06431 0.021968
g30 -0.01459 0.022015 -0.66 0.508 -0.05779 0.028611
g31 -0.01491 0.020526 -0.73 0.468 -0.05519 0.025371
g32 -0.01456 0.021314 -0.68 0.495 -0.05639 0.027266
g33 -0.0216 0.021758 -0.99 0.321 -0.0643 0.021097
g34 -0.00826 0.020108 -0.41 0.681 -0.04772 0.031202
g35 -0.01953 0.020378 -0.96 0.338 -0.05952 0.020462
g36 0.015429 0.032251 0.48 0.632 -0.04786 0.078718
g37 -0.00274 0.022061 -0.12 0.901 -0.04603 0.040553
g38 0.01969 0.022041 0.89 0.372 -0.02356 0.062943
g39 0.041252 0.023821 1.73 0.084(*) -0.00549 0.087997
g40 0.013112 0.020521 0.64 0.523 -0.02716 0.053383
g41 0.023191 0.020629 1.12 0.261 -0.01729 0.063673
g42 0.020414 0.022522 0.91 0.365 -0.02378 0.06461
g43 0.015101 0.021306 0.71 0.479 -0.02671 0.056912
g44 0.028168 0.019706 1.43 0.153 -0.0105 0.066838
g45 0.01119 0.022041 0.51 0.612 -0.03206 0.054442
g46 0.024157 0.023343 1.03 0.301 -0.02165 0.069964
31
g47 0.00951 0.021193 0.45 0.654 -0.03208 0.051098
g48 0.007551 0.021858 0.35 0.73 -0.03534 0.050444
g49 -0.00595 0.023976 -0.25 0.804 -0.053 0.041096
g50 0.000394 0.023819 0.02 0.987 -0.04635 0.047135
g51 -0.01166 0.024868 -0.47 0.639 -0.06046 0.03714
g52 0.007726 0.022862 0.34 0.735 -0.03714 0.052589
g53 -0.00681 0.023273 -0.29 0.77 -0.05248 0.038855
g54 0.001128 0.022698 0.05 0.96 -0.04341 0.045671
g55 -0.00276 0.024504 -0.11 0.91 -0.05084 0.045332
g56 -0.0037 0.02214 -0.17 0.867 -0.04715 0.039747
g57 -0.01108 0.025077 -0.44 0.659 -0.06029 0.038128
g58 -0.01288 0.021454 -0.6 0.548 -0.05498 0.029222
g59 0.002195 0.024748 0.09 0.929 -0.04637 0.05076
g60 -0.00992 0.022106 -0.45 0.654 -0.0533 0.033464
g61 0.007792 0.029765 0.26 0.794 -0.05062 0.066202
cons 0.474443 0.024745 19.17 0(***) 0.425884 0.523003
Number of obs 1054
R-squared 0.4296
OLS Regression ttw133; (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.; (*)
signicant at 10% C.I.
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Gini index Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
ttw133 -0.24076 0.016967 -14.19 0(***) -0.27406 -0.20747
tmpit -0.0557 0.028137 -1.98 0.048(**) -0.11091 -0.00049
nptdi -0.00123 0.000152 -8.08 0(***) -0.00153 -0.00093
gdpgr99 0.003717 0.001212 3.07 0.002(***) 0.001338 0.006096
ur99 0.003761 0.000538 6.99 0(***) 0.002705 0.004817
cpi99 0.003329 0.000564 5.91 0(***) 0.002223 0.004436
g1 -0.04796 0.044732 -1.07 0.284 -0.13574 0.039818
g2 -0.01879 0.033071 -0.57 0.57 -0.08369 0.046102
g3 0.002495 0.02708 0.09 0.927 -0.05065 0.055637
g4 -0.01684 0.023416 -0.72 0.472 -0.06279 0.02911
g5 -0.01278 0.02354 -0.54 0.587 -0.05897 0.033416
g6 -0.03823 0.022497 -1.7 0.09(*) -0.08238 0.005916
g7 -0.03082 0.022752 -1.35 0.176 -0.07547 0.013825
g8 -0.05092 0.020532 -2.48 0.013(**) -0.09122 -0.01063
g9 -0.04708 0.020332 -2.32 0.021(**) -0.08697 -0.00718
g10 -0.06087 0.019983 -3.05 0.002(***) -0.10008 -0.02165
g11 -0.0572 0.02156 -2.65 0.008(***) -0.09951 -0.01489
g12 -0.04536 0.021093 -2.15 0.032(**) -0.08675 -0.00397
g13 -0.05675 0.020013 -2.84 0.005(***) -0.09603 -0.01748
g14 -0.04373 0.023231 -1.88 0.06(*) -0.08932 0.00186
g15 -0.05049 0.020468 -2.47 0.014(**) -0.09066 -0.01032
g16 -0.03276 0.022986 -1.43 0.154 -0.07786 0.012351
g17 -0.03842 0.020777 -1.85 0.065(*) -0.07919 0.002352
g18 -0.04039 0.021073 -1.92 0.056(*) -0.08175 0.000963
g19 -0.05085 0.02198 -2.31 0.021(**) -0.09398 -0.00772
g20 -0.04138 0.021363 -1.94 0.053(*) -0.0833 0.000543
g21 -0.04254 0.019571 -2.17 0.03(*) -0.08094 -0.00413
g22 -0.0427 0.021053 -2.03 0.043(**) -0.08402 -0.00139
g23 -0.04093 0.020659 -1.98 0.048(**) -0.08147 -0.0004
g24 -0.04215 0.021493 -1.96 0.05(**) -0.08433 2.73E-05
g25 -0.0363 0.02135 -1.7 0.089(*) -0.0782 0.005593
g26 -0.04259 0.020918 -2.04 0.042(**) -0.08364 -0.00154
g27 -0.03686 0.021777 -1.69 0.091(**) -0.07959 0.005875
g28 -0.02599 0.022451 -1.16 0.247 -0.07004 0.01807
g29 -0.02117 0.021984 -0.96 0.336 -0.06431 0.021968
g30 -0.01459 0.022015 -0.66 0.508 -0.05779 0.028611
g31 -0.01491 0.020526 -0.73 0.468 -0.05519 0.025371
g32 -0.01456 0.021314 -0.68 0.495 -0.05639 0.027266
g33 -0.0216 0.021758 -0.99 0.321 -0.0643 0.021097
g34 -0.00826 0.020108 -0.41 0.681 -0.04772 0.031202
g35 -0.01953 0.020378 -0.96 0.338 -0.05952 0.020462
g36 0.015429 0.032251 0.48 0.632 -0.04786 0.078718
g37 -0.00274 0.022061 -0.12 0.901 -0.04603 0.040553
g38 0.01969 0.022041 0.89 0.372 -0.02356 0.062943
g39 0.041252 0.023821 1.73 0.084(*) -0.00549 0.087997
g40 0.013112 0.020521 0.64 0.523 -0.02716 0.053383
g41 0.023191 0.020629 1.12 0.261 -0.01729 0.063673
g42 0.020414 0.022522 0.91 0.365 -0.02378 0.06461
g43 0.015101 0.021306 0.71 0.479 -0.02671 0.056912
g44 0.028168 0.019706 1.43 0.153 -0.0105 0.066838
g45 0.01119 0.022041 0.51 0.612 -0.03206 0.054442
g46 0.024157 0.023343 1.03 0.301 -0.02165 0.069964
33
g47 0.00951 0.021193 0.45 0.654 -0.03208 0.051098
g48 0.007551 0.021858 0.35 0.73 -0.03534 0.050444
g49 -0.00595 0.023976 -0.25 0.804 -0.053 0.041096
g50 0.000394 0.023819 0.02 0.987 -0.04635 0.047135
g51 -0.01166 0.024868 -0.47 0.639 -0.06046 0.03714
g52 0.007726 0.022862 0.34 0.735 -0.03714 0.052589
g53 -0.00681 0.023273 -0.29 0.77 -0.05248 0.038855
g54 0.001128 0.022698 0.05 0.96 -0.04341 0.045671
g55 -0.00276 0.024504 -0.11 0.91 -0.05084 0.045332
g56 -0.0037 0.02214 -0.17 0.867 -0.04715 0.039747
g57 -0.01108 0.025077 -0.44 0.659 -0.06029 0.038128
g58 -0.01288 0.021454 -0.6 0.548 -0.05498 0.029222
g59 0.002195 0.024748 0.09 0.929 -0.04637 0.05076
g60 -0.00992 0.022106 -0.45 0.654 -0.0533 0.033464
g61 0.007792 0.029765 0.26 0.794 -0.05062 0.066202
cons 0.474443 0.024745 19.17 0(***) 0.425884 0.523003
Number of obs 1054
R-squared 0.4720
OLS Regression ttw167; (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.; (*)
signicant at 10% C.I.
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Gini index Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
attw67 -0.33975 0.021997 -15.45 0(***) -0.38292 -0.29659
tmpit -0.00283 0.02861 -0.1 0.921 -0.05897 0.053314
nptdi -0.00131 0.000155 -8.46 0(***) -0.00161 -0.00101
gdpgr99 -0.0046 0.001317 -3.49 0.001(***) -0.00718 -0.00201
ur99 0.003453 0.000542 6.37 0(***) 0.00239 0.004516
cpi99 0.003837 0.00057 6.73 0(***) 0.002718 0.004956
g1 -0.04796 0.044461 -1.08 0.281 -0.13521 0.039287
g2 -0.01879 0.032597 -0.58 0.564 -0.08276 0.045173
g3 0.002495 0.026656 0.09 0.925 -0.04981 0.054804
g4 -0.01684 0.02327 -0.72 0.469 -0.0625 0.028825
g5 -0.01278 0.023091 -0.55 0.58 -0.05809 0.032536
g6 -0.03823 0.022245 -1.72 0.086(*) -0.08188 0.00542
g7 -0.03082 0.022014 -1.4 0.162 -0.07402 0.012377
g8 -0.05092 0.020069 -2.54 0.011(**) -0.09031 -0.01154
g9 -0.04708 0.019582 -2.4 0.016(**) -0.0855 -0.00865
g10 -0.06087 0.019174 -3.17 0.002(***) -0.09849 -0.02324
g11 -0.0572 0.02099 -2.73 0.007(***) -0.09839 -0.01601
g12 -0.04536 0.020073 -2.26 0.024(**) -0.08475 -0.00597
g13 -0.05675 0.019501 -2.91 0.004(***) -0.09502 -0.01848
g14 -0.04373 0.022428 -1.95 0.051(*) -0.08774 0.000284
g15 -0.05049 0.019737 -2.56 0.011(**) -0.08922 -0.01176
g16 -0.03276 0.021802 -1.5 0.133 -0.07554 0.010027
g17 -0.03842 0.019801 -1.94 0.053(**) -0.07728 0.000436
g18 -0.04039 0.019686 -2.05 0.04(**) -0.07902 -0.00176
g19 -0.05085 0.021155 -2.4 0.016(**) -0.09236 -0.00933
g20 -0.04138 0.020873 -1.98 0.048(**) -0.08234 -0.00042
g21 -0.04254 0.018703 -2.27 0.023(**) -0.07924 -0.00584
g22 -0.0427 0.020158 -2.12 0.034(**) -0.08226 -0.00315
g23 -0.04093 0.019876 -2.06 0.04(**) -0.07994 -0.00193
g24 -0.04215 0.020871 -2.02 0.044(**) -0.08311 -0.00119
g25 -0.0363 0.020188 -1.8 0.072(*) -0.07592 0.003313
g26 -0.04259 0.020099 -2.12 0.034(**) -0.08203 -0.00315
g27 -0.03686 0.020786 -1.77 0.076(*) -0.07765 0.00393
g28 -0.02599 0.021225 -1.22 0.221 -0.06764 0.015664
g29 -0.02117 0.020576 -1.03 0.304 -0.06155 0.019205
g30 -0.01459 0.020696 -0.71 0.481 -0.0552 0.026022
g31 -0.01491 0.019596 -0.76 0.447 -0.05336 0.023548
g32 -0.01456 0.020567 -0.71 0.479 -0.05492 0.025799
g33 -0.0216 0.020914 -1.03 0.302 -0.06264 0.019439
g34 -0.00826 0.019174 -0.43 0.667 -0.04588 0.029368
g35 -0.01953 0.019721 -0.99 0.322 -0.05823 0.019172
g36 0.015429 0.031347 0.49 0.623 -0.04608 0.076944
g37 -0.00274 0.020927 -0.13 0.896 -0.0438 0.038328
g38 0.01969 0.02119 0.93 0.353 -0.02189 0.061273
g39 0.041252 0.023859 1.73 0.084(*) -0.00557 0.088071
g40 0.013112 0.019524 0.67 0.502 -0.0252 0.051425
g41 0.023191 0.020156 1.15 0.25 -0.01636 0.062746
g42 0.020414 0.021693 0.94 0.347 -0.02216 0.062983
g43 0.015101 0.02053 0.74 0.462 -0.02519 0.055388
g44 0.028168 0.018913 1.49 0.137 -0.00895 0.065283
g45 0.01119 0.021769 0.51 0.607 -0.03153 0.053908
g46 0.024157 0.021954 1.1 0.271 -0.01893 0.067239
35
g47 0.00951 0.020503 0.46 0.643 -0.03073 0.049745
g48 0.007551 0.021203 0.36 0.722 -0.03406 0.049159
g49 -0.00595 0.022976 -0.26 0.796 -0.05104 0.039133
g50 0.000394 0.022603 0.02 0.986 -0.04396 0.04475
g51 -0.01166 0.024223 -0.48 0.63 -0.05919 0.035874
g52 0.007726 0.021904 0.35 0.724 -0.03526 0.050709
g53 -0.00681 0.021965 -0.31 0.756 -0.04992 0.036289
g54 0.001128 0.02162 0.05 0.958 -0.0413 0.043555
g55 -0.00276 0.023419 -0.12 0.906 -0.04871 0.043202
g56 -0.0037 0.021246 -0.17 0.862 -0.04539 0.037992
g57 -0.01108 0.023983 -0.46 0.644 -0.05815 0.035982
g58 -0.01288 0.020314 -0.63 0.526 -0.05274 0.026984
g59 0.002195 0.02367 0.09 0.926 -0.04425 0.048644
g60 -0.00992 0.021266 -0.47 0.641 -0.05165 0.031814
g61 0.007792 0.029251 0.27 0.79 -0.04961 0.065193
cons 0.475867 0.024318 19.57 0(***) 0.428146 0.523587
Number of obs 1054
R-squared 0.4533
OLS Regression attw67; (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.; (*)
signicant at 10% C.I.
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Gini index Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
attw100 -0.34485 0.022688 -15.2 0(***) -0.38937 -0.30033
tmpit 0.014947 0.028642 0.52 0.602 -0.04126 0.071154
nptdi -0.00131 0.000155 -8.42 0(***) -0.00161 -0.001
gdpgr99 -0.00193 0.001267 -1.52 0.128 -0.00442 0.000555
ur99 0.00372 0.000535 6.96 0(***) 0.002671 0.004769
cpi99 0.004089 0.000573 7.13 0(***) 0.002963 0.005214
g1 -0.04796 0.044191 -1.09 0.278 -0.13468 0.038756
g2 -0.01879 0.032621 -0.58 0.565 -0.08281 0.045219
g3 0.002495 0.0271 0.09 0.927 -0.05069 0.055676
g4 -0.01684 0.023707 -0.71 0.478 -0.06336 0.029682
g5 -0.01278 0.023705 -0.54 0.59 -0.0593 0.033741
g6 -0.03823 0.022499 -1.7 0.09(*) -0.08238 0.00592
g7 -0.03082 0.022495 -1.37 0.171 -0.07497 0.013321
g8 -0.05092 0.020605 -2.47 0.014(**) -0.09136 -0.01049
g9 -0.04708 0.020164 -2.33 0.02(**) -0.08664 -0.00751
g10 -0.06087 0.019644 -3.1 0.002(***) -0.09942 -0.02232
g11 -0.0572 0.021682 -2.64 0.008(***) -0.09975 -0.01465
g12 -0.04536 0.020721 -2.19 0.029(**) -0.08602 -0.0047
g13 -0.05675 0.020009 -2.84 0.005(***) -0.09602 -0.01749
g14 -0.04373 0.022888 -1.91 0.056(*) -0.08864 0.001187
g15 -0.05049 0.020492 -2.46 0.014(**) -0.0907 -0.01028
g16 -0.03276 0.022484 -1.46 0.145 -0.07688 0.011365
g17 -0.03842 0.020474 -1.88 0.061(*) -0.0786 0.001757
g18 -0.04039 0.020275 -1.99 0.047(**) -0.08018 -0.0006
g19 -0.05085 0.021623 -2.35 0.019(**) -0.09328 -0.00842
g20 -0.04138 0.02161 -1.91 0.056(*) -0.08379 0.001027
g21 -0.04254 0.019241 -2.21 0.027(**) -0.0803 -0.00478
g22 -0.0427 0.020584 -2.07 0.038(**) -0.0831 -0.00231
g23 -0.04093 0.020357 -2.01 0.045(**) -0.08088 -0.00099
g24 -0.04215 0.02152 -1.96 0.05(**) -0.08438 0.00008
g25 -0.0363 0.020967 -1.73 0.084(*) -0.07745 0.004842
g26 -0.04259 0.020742 -2.05 0.04(**) -0.0833 -0.00189
g27 -0.03686 0.02139 -1.72 0.085(*) -0.07883 0.005117
g28 -0.02599 0.021809 -1.19 0.234 -0.06878 0.016811
g29 -0.02117 0.021439 -0.99 0.324 -0.06324 0.020899
g30 -0.01459 0.021451 -0.68 0.497 -0.05669 0.027505
g31 -0.01491 0.02026 -0.74 0.462 -0.05467 0.024851
g32 -0.01456 0.021159 -0.69 0.492 -0.05608 0.026962
g33 -0.0216 0.021422 -1.01 0.314 -0.06364 0.020437
g34 -0.00826 0.019858 -0.42 0.678 -0.04723 0.030711
g35 -0.01953 0.020532 -0.95 0.342 -0.05982 0.020764
g36 0.015429 0.032262 0.48 0.633 -0.04788 0.078739
g37 -0.00274 0.021543 -0.13 0.899 -0.04501 0.039536
g38 0.01969 0.022019 0.89 0.371 -0.02352 0.062899
g39 0.041252 0.024146 1.71 0.088(*) -0.00613 0.088636
g40 0.013112 0.020173 0.65 0.516 -0.02647 0.052698
g41 0.023191 0.020678 1.12 0.262 -0.01739 0.06377
g42 0.020414 0.02241 0.91 0.363 -0.02356 0.06439
g43 0.015101 0.021149 0.71 0.475 -0.0264 0.056603
g44 0.028168 0.019627 1.44 0.152 -0.01035 0.066684
g45 0.01119 0.022371 0.5 0.617 -0.03271 0.055091
g46 0.024157 0.022637 1.07 0.286 -0.02027 0.06858
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g47 0.00951 0.021106 0.45 0.652 -0.03191 0.050929
g48 0.007551 0.021734 0.35 0.728 -0.0351 0.050201
g49 -0.00595 0.023751 -0.25 0.802 -0.05256 0.040653
g50 0.000394 0.023316 0.02 0.987 -0.04536 0.046148
g51 -0.01166 0.024911 -0.47 0.64 -0.06055 0.037225
g52 0.007726 0.022604 0.34 0.733 -0.03663 0.052083
g53 -0.00681 0.022866 -0.3 0.766 -0.05169 0.038058
g54 0.001128 0.022415 0.05 0.96 -0.04286 0.045115
g55 -0.00276 0.024023 -0.11 0.909 -0.0499 0.044386
g56 -0.0037 0.022017 -0.17 0.867 -0.04691 0.039504
g57 -0.01108 0.024406 -0.45 0.65 -0.05898 0.03681
g58 -0.01288 0.021254 -0.61 0.545 -0.05459 0.028829
g59 0.002195 0.024319 0.09 0.928 -0.04553 0.049917
g60 -0.00992 0.021813 -0.45 0.649 -0.05272 0.03289
g61 0.007792 0.030088 0.26 0.796 -0.05125 0.066835
cons 0.47152 0.024669 19.11 0(***) 0.423109 0.51993
Number of obs 1054
R-squared 0.4543
OLS Regression attw100; (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.; (*)
signicant at 10% C.I.
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Gini index Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
attw133 -0.35432 0.022434 -15.79 0(***) -0.39835 -0.3103
tmpit 0.034216 0.028787 1.19 0.235 -0.02227 0.090706
nptdi -0.00129 0.000153 -8.46 0(***) -0.00159 -0.00099
gdpgr99 -0.00059 0.001235 -0.48 0.634 -0.00301 0.001835
ur99 0.00376 0.000524 7.18 0(***) 0.002732 0.004787
cpi99 0.004163 0.000572 7.28 0(***) 0.00304 0.005285
g1 -0.04796 0.043972 -1.09 0.276 -0.13425 0.038326
g2 -0.01879 0.032457 -0.58 0.563 -0.08249 0.044898
g3 0.002495 0.027163 0.09 0.927 -0.05081 0.055798
g4 -0.01684 0.023726 -0.71 0.478 -0.0634 0.029718
g5 -0.01278 0.023749 -0.54 0.591 -0.05938 0.033826
g6 -0.03823 0.022429 -1.7 0.089(*) -0.08224 0.005781
g7 -0.03082 0.022673 -1.36 0.174 -0.07532 0.01367
g8 -0.05092 0.020563 -2.48 0.013(**) -0.09128 -0.01057
g9 -0.04708 0.020189 -2.33 0.02(**) -0.08669 -0.00746
g10 -0.06087 0.019611 -3.1 0.002(***) -0.09935 -0.02238
g11 -0.0572 0.02162 -2.65 0.008(***) -0.09963 -0.01477
g12 -0.04536 0.020721 -2.19 0.029(**) -0.08602 -0.00469
g13 -0.05675 0.020011 -2.84 0.005(***) -0.09602 -0.01748
g14 -0.04373 0.022815 -1.92 0.056(*) -0.0885 0.001044
g15 -0.05049 0.020528 -2.46 0.014(**) -0.09077 -0.01021
g16 -0.03276 0.022514 -1.45 0.146 -0.07694 0.011423
g17 -0.03842 0.020482 -1.88 0.061(*) -0.07861 0.001774
g18 -0.04039 0.020355 -1.98 0.047(**) -0.08034 -0.00045
g19 -0.05085 0.021573 -2.36 0.019(**) -0.09318 -0.00851
g20 -0.04138 0.021688 -1.91 0.057(*) -0.08394 0.001181
g21 -0.04254 0.019253 -2.21 0.027(**) -0.08032 -0.00476
g22 -0.0427 0.020581 -2.07 0.038(**) -0.08309 -0.00232
g23 -0.04093 0.020208 -2.03 0.043(**) -0.08059 -0.00128
g24 -0.04215 0.021399 -1.97 0.049(**) -0.08414 -0.00016
g25 -0.0363 0.021146 -1.72 0.086(*) -0.0778 0.005193
g26 -0.04259 0.020682 -2.06 0.04(**) -0.08318 -0.00201
g27 -0.03686 0.021292 -1.73 0.084(*) -0.07864 0.004925
g28 -0.02599 0.021794 -1.19 0.233 -0.06875 0.016781
g29 -0.02117 0.021534 -0.98 0.326 -0.06343 0.021085
g30 -0.01459 0.021461 -0.68 0.497 -0.05671 0.027524
g31 -0.01491 0.020225 -0.74 0.461 -0.0546 0.024781
g32 -0.01456 0.021109 -0.69 0.49 -0.05598 0.026863
g33 -0.0216 0.021282 -1.01 0.31 -0.06337 0.020163
g34 -0.00826 0.019828 -0.42 0.677 -0.04717 0.030652
g35 -0.01953 0.020487 -0.95 0.341 -0.05973 0.020676
g36 0.015429 0.032493 0.47 0.635 -0.04833 0.079192
g37 -0.00274 0.021391 -0.13 0.898 -0.04471 0.039238
g38 0.01969 0.022095 0.89 0.373 -0.02367 0.063048
g39 0.041252 0.02414 1.71 0.088 -0.00612 0.088624
g40 0.013112 0.020114 0.65 0.515 -0.02636 0.052584
g41 0.023191 0.020501 1.13 0.258 -0.01704 0.063422
g42 0.020414 0.022393 0.91 0.362 -0.02353 0.064357
g43 0.015101 0.021084 0.72 0.474 -0.02627 0.056475
g44 0.028168 0.019686 1.43 0.153 -0.01046 0.0668
g45 0.01119 0.022171 0.5 0.614 -0.03232 0.054698
g46 0.024157 0.022634 1.07 0.286 -0.02026 0.068573
39
g47 0.00951 0.021172 0.45 0.653 -0.03204 0.051057
g48 0.007551 0.021795 0.35 0.729 -0.03522 0.050321
g49 -0.00595 0.023764 -0.25 0.802 -0.05259 0.04068
g50 0.000394 0.0234 0.02 0.987 -0.04553 0.046312
g51 -0.01166 0.025006 -0.47 0.641 -0.06073 0.037412
g52 0.007726 0.022763 0.34 0.734 -0.03694 0.052396
g53 -0.00681 0.022985 -0.3 0.767 -0.05192 0.038291
g54 0.001128 0.022423 0.05 0.96 -0.04287 0.04513
g55 -0.00276 0.023984 -0.11 0.909 -0.04982 0.04431
g56 -0.0037 0.022083 -0.17 0.867 -0.04704 0.039634
g57 -0.01108 0.024273 -0.46 0.648 -0.05872 0.036551
g58 -0.01288 0.021411 -0.6 0.548 -0.0549 0.029137
g59 0.002195 0.024411 0.09 0.928 -0.04571 0.050098
g60 -0.00992 0.021768 -0.46 0.649 -0.05263 0.032801
g61 0.007792 0.030132 0.26 0.796 -0.05134 0.066922
cons 0.471559 0.024513 19.24 0(***) 0.423456 0.519663
Number of obs 1054
R-squared 0.4651
OLS Regression attw133; (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.; (*)
signicant at 10% C.I.
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Gini index Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
attw167 -0.36892 0.022812 -16.17 0(***) -0.41369 -0.32416
tmpit 0.052806 0.02888 1.83 0.068(**) -0.00387 0.10948
nptdi -0.00134 0.00015 -8.91 0(***) -0.00163 -0.00104
gdpgr99 -0.00033 0.001202 -0.27 0.784 -0.00269 0.002028
ur99 0.003747 0.000519 7.21 0(***) 0.002728 0.004766
cpi99 0.004263 0.000571 7.47 0(***) 0.003144 0.005383
g1 -0.04796 0.043982 -1.09 0.276 -0.13427 0.038347
g2 -0.01879 0.032367 -0.58 0.562 -0.08231 0.044721
g3 0.002495 0.02702 0.09 0.926 -0.05053 0.055519
g4 -0.01684 0.023625 -0.71 0.476 -0.0632 0.029521
g5 -0.01278 0.023555 -0.54 0.588 -0.059 0.033447
g6 -0.03823 0.022232 -1.72 0.086(*) -0.08186 0.005395
g7 -0.03082 0.022547 -1.37 0.172 -0.07507 0.013421
g8 -0.05092 0.020344 -2.5 0.012(**) -0.09085 -0.011
g9 -0.04708 0.019977 -2.36 0.019(**) -0.08628 -0.00787
g10 -0.06087 0.019483 -3.12 0.002(***) -0.0991 -0.02264
g11 -0.0572 0.021386 -2.67 0.008(***) -0.09917 -0.01523
g12 -0.04536 0.020473 -2.22 0.027(**) -0.08553 -0.00518
g13 -0.05675 0.01981 -2.86 0.004(***) -0.09563 -0.01788
g14 -0.04373 0.022584 -1.94 0.053(*) -0.08805 0.000589
g15 -0.05049 0.020323 -2.48 0.013(**) -0.09037 -0.01061
g16 -0.03276 0.022393 -1.46 0.144 -0.0767 0.011186
g17 -0.03842 0.020317 -1.89 0.059(*) -0.07829 0.00145
g18 -0.04039 0.020251 -1.99 0.046(**) -0.08013 -0.00065
g19 -0.05085 0.021374 -2.38 0.018(**) -0.09279 -0.0089
g20 -0.04138 0.021522 -1.92 0.055(*) -0.08361 0.000855
g21 -0.04254 0.019131 -2.22 0.026(**) -0.08008 -0.005
g22 -0.0427 0.02047 -2.09 0.037(**) -0.08287 -0.00254
g23 -0.04093 0.02001 -2.05 0.041(**) -0.0802 -0.00167
g24 -0.04215 0.021158 -1.99 0.047(**) -0.08367 -0.00063
g25 -0.0363 0.020942 -1.73 0.083(*) -0.0774 0.004793
g26 -0.04259 0.020418 -2.09 0.037(**) -0.08266 -0.00253
g27 -0.03686 0.02104 -1.75 0.08(*) -0.07815 0.004429
g28 -0.02599 0.021534 -1.21 0.228 -0.06824 0.01627
g29 -0.02117 0.021284 -0.99 0.32 -0.06294 0.020595
g30 -0.01459 0.021243 -0.69 0.492 -0.05628 0.027095
g31 -0.01491 0.019971 -0.75 0.456 -0.0541 0.024283
g32 -0.01456 0.02085 -0.7 0.485 -0.05548 0.026355
g33 -0.0216 0.021113 -1.02 0.307 -0.06303 0.019831
g34 -0.00826 0.01954 -0.42 0.673 -0.0466 0.030087
g35 -0.01953 0.020254 -0.96 0.335 -0.05927 0.020219
g36 0.015429 0.032518 0.47 0.635 -0.04838 0.079242
g37 -0.00274 0.021085 -0.13 0.897 -0.04411 0.038638
g38 0.01969 0.021919 0.9 0.369 -0.02332 0.062704
g39 0.041252 0.024076 1.71 0.087(*) -0.00599 0.088497
g40 0.013112 0.019938 0.66 0.511 -0.02601 0.052238
g41 0.023191 0.020221 1.15 0.252 -0.01649 0.062872
g42 0.020414 0.022073 0.92 0.355 -0.0229 0.063729
g43 0.015101 0.020816 0.73 0.468 -0.02575 0.055949
g44 0.028168 0.019459 1.45 0.148 -0.01002 0.066353
g45 0.01119 0.02174 0.51 0.607 -0.03147 0.053853
g46 0.024157 0.022284 1.08 0.279 -0.01957 0.067885
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g47 0.00951 0.020968 0.45 0.65 -0.03164 0.050657
g48 0.007551 0.02156 0.35 0.726 -0.03476 0.049861
g49 -0.00595 0.023372 -0.25 0.799 -0.05182 0.039909
g50 0.000394 0.023146 0.02 0.986 -0.04503 0.045815
g51 -0.01166 0.02473 -0.47 0.637 -0.06019 0.03687
g52 0.007726 0.022615 0.34 0.733 -0.03665 0.052105
g53 -0.00681 0.02277 -0.3 0.765 -0.0515 0.037868
g54 0.001128 0.02218 0.05 0.959 -0.0424 0.044653
g55 -0.00276 0.023738 -0.12 0.908 -0.04934 0.043827
g56 -0.0037 0.021789 -0.17 0.865 -0.04646 0.039057
g57 -0.01108 0.023965 -0.46 0.644 -0.05811 0.035945
g58 -0.01288 0.021161 -0.61 0.543 -0.0544 0.028645
g59 0.002195 0.024108 0.09 0.927 -0.04511 0.049504
g60 -0.00992 0.021563 -0.46 0.646 -0.05223 0.032399
g61 0.007792 0.029858 0.26 0.794 -0.0508 0.066385
cons 0.476033 0.024325 19.57 0(***) 0.428298 0.523768
Number of obs 1054
R-squared 0.4720
OLS Regression attw167; (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.; (*)
signicant at 10% C.I.
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